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I. INTRODUCTION

Elizabeth Key, an Afro-Anglo woman, was born around 1630 in the
Virginia Colony. Twenty-five years later she sued for her freedom after
the overseers of her late master’s estate classified her and her infant son
as negroes (Africans or descendants of Africans) rather than as an
indentured servant with a free-born child. 1 Unwilling to accept

∗ Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, University of Maryland School of Law. The
author would like to thank my colleague David Bogen for his helpful suggestions on earlier versions
of this draft, Rennard Strickland for his support of this project, Sue McCarthy and Maxine
Grosshans for their research assistance.
1. The extant court documents reporting Elizabeth Key’s case are reprinted in THE OLD
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permanent servitude, Elizabeth sued for their freedom, and after
protracted litigation she and her son were set free.
A few historians and legal scholars mention her case in passing as
proof that by the mid seventeenth century people of African ancestry
were held as slaves in Virginia. 2 Only feminist historian Kathleen
Brown even mentions that Elizabeth’s lawsuit involved not only her
freedom, but that of her son. 3 To the rest of the historians she was
simply a slave, her gender, son and mixed ancestry were irrelevant.
None looked closely at the significance of her three interlinking legal
arguments: (1) that she was a practicing Christian; (2) who was the
daughter of a free Englishman; (3) who bound her out as an indentured
servant for nine years which period had expired.
Arguably Elizabeth’s pleadings might be an early example of what
Kenji Yoshino characterizes as “covering,” downplaying aspects of
one’s identity. 4 In crafting her legal argument around her father’s
ancestry and subjecthood Elizabeth downplayed the African ancestry of
her enslaved mother. Her argument also might be an example of “racial
performance” where the extent one does things that English women and
men did during the period becomes an important determinant of one’s
legal status. 5 But as I explain in this article other cases decided during
this period suggest otherwise.

DOMINION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1606-1689
165-69 (Warren M. Billings ed., 1975)[hereinafter OLD DOMINION].
2. The most complete scholarly discussion of Elizabeth Key’s freedom suit is found in
Warren M. Billings, The Case of Fernando and Elizabeth Key: A Note on the Status of Blacks in
Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 30 WM. & MARY Q. 467 (1973) (discussing Key's case along with a
later suit filed by an African male, Fernando, and focusing on their claim that persons of African
descent who were Christians were free not slaves) [hereinafter Billings, The Cases of Fernando and
Elizabeth]; Warren M. Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,
99 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45, 55-57 (1991) (discussing the mulatto aspects of the suit).
Other scholars refer to Elizabeth’s case for more limited reasons. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN
THE MATTER OF COLOR 44 (1978); Jung Kim, Comment, Nguyen v. INS: The Weakening of Equal
Protection in the Face of Plenary Power, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 43, 60 (2002); William M.
Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery In British North America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711,
1755 n.157 (1996); Thomas Ingersoll, “Release Us Out of This Cruell Bondegg”: An Appeal From
Virginia in 1723, 51 WM. & MARY Q. 777, 778 n.6 (1994).
3. Kathleen Mary Brown, Gender and the Genesis of a Race and Class System in Virginia,
1630-175 (May 29, 1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin) (on file with
University of Wisconsin-Madison Library, University of Wisconsin).
4. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002).
5. For a discussion of this concept as it relates to slavery see Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 113
n.8, 163-64 (1998). See also John Tehranian, Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization
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Instead I argue that Elizabeth’s case and the Virginia colonial
authorities reaction to it can better be explained by looking at evolving
notions of subjecthood in seventeenth century England. But I also
acknowledge that Elizabeth’s case has racial overtones. Like Scott v.
Sanford 6 decided approximately two hundred years later, Elizabeth’s
case raises questions about the place of persons with African ancestry
within the early Virginia colonial community. From the beginning of
this nation “race has been a profound determinant of one’s political
rights, one’s location in the labor market, and indeed one’s sense of
‘identity.’” 7
When Dred Scott sued for his freedom the United States Supreme
Court decided he could not sue in federal court because whether free or
not, as a person of African descent he was not a citizen. 8 But in
Elizabeth Key’s time “subjecthood” rather than “citizenship” determined
one’s rights and privileges within the colonial community. In the end
Elizabeth was more fortunate than Scott because of her connection to a
powerful English father and a potential English husband. This essay
explores Elizabeth Key’s freedom suit and what it teaches us about
community belonging, racial identity and gender in early colonial
America.
Racial markers are imposed or adopted based on historical, social,
ancestral, and physical components. 9 As historian Ira Berlin writes:

Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000). Tehranian
in his discussion of “race” in seventeenth century Virginia identifies Christian religion as one of the
earlier surrogates for what we today call whiteness, he overlooks the significance of ancestry.
Tehranian, supra, at 830. English ancestry is the surrogate for skin color in the early nineteenth
century whiteness cases. Id. at 831. But as Tehranian subsequently points out, as more negroes
became Christians, the determination of community acceptance as white relied more on ancestry or
skin tone. Id. at 830-31.
6. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
7. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 1 (1994); see also HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS 13-21 (1994).
8. Scott, 60 U.S. at 427. According to the Court:
[t]he Question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this
country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to
the citizen?
Id. at 403. The Court said no. Id. at 529.
9. Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994). See also Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23-36 (1991) (discussing racial
categories).
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“Race is not simply a social construction; it is a particular kind of social
construction—a historical construction . . . it cannot exist outside of time
and place.” 10 During the first half of the seventeenth century notions of
American whiteness and race were in their formative stage as were the
notions of English subjecthood that greatly influenced American ideas
about citizenship. Words like “English” and “Christian” operated as
exclusionary categories in the way that the racial category white has
operated in the United States since the nineteenth century.
Virginia, one of the first colonies to formulate racial definitions, did
not attempt to statutorily define these categories until the early
eighteenth century. 11 The evolving definitions, usually tied to African
ancestry, varied over the centuries 12 reflecting, perhaps, the not so secret
genealogies of its powerful ruling aristocracies. 13 Underlying these

10. IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN
NORTH AMERICAN 1 (1998). See also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1707 n.9 (2000) (explaining that race is fluid, and that “racial identities are
unstable, and race has no meaning except that ascribed to it”).
11. An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, Act of Oct. 1705, in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE;
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619 447-62 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter Hening,
STATUTES AT LARGE] (enacted 1705) (“mulatto defined as child, grandchild, or great-grandchild of
Negro (and presumably a white) or child of Indian (and presumably a white)”); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial
and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967 (1989).
12. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 11, at 1977-79.
13. Thus, in 1967 Virginia in Loving v. Virginia defended its prohibition against interracial
marriage before the United States Supreme Court on the grounds of preserving the racial “integrity
of its citizens.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). Yet the State saw no inconsistency with
this goal and its definition of a white person as someone with “no trace whatever of any blood other
than Caucasian,” except for any “person who [has] one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the
American Indian and no other non-Caucasic blood.” Id. at 5 n.4 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54
(1960) (repealed 1968)). VA. CODE ANN. §20-57 (1960 Repl. Vol.) contained the prohibition
against interracial marriage (marriage between “a white person and a colored person”) which the
United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia. Id. at 5 n.3, 12.
The so-called “Pocahontas exception” preserved the white racial status of prominent Virginians
descended from John Rolfe and Powhatan Indian “princess” Pocahontas, as well as that of other
Virginians whose ancestors entered the colony during the seventeenth century. Walter Wadlington,
The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV.
1189, 1202-03 (1966). Given the scarcity of European women in the largely bachelor colony during
the first few decades of the seventeenth century, many white Virginians who trace their ancestry
back to early Virginia colonists have at least one Native American, or perhaps African ancestor.
Liaisons between Englishmen and Indian or later African women resulted in Anglo-Indian and
Anglo-African offspring. David D. Smits, “Abominable Mixture” Toward the Repudiation of
Anglo-Indian Intermarriage in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 95 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY.
157, 172 (1987).
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shifting legal definitions was the denial of racial hybridity in favor of
mono-racialism. 14 From the colonial period forward this country
resisted creation of a space in the body politic for whose ancestry was
non-European. Birthright subjecthood in the colonized country and
citizenship status in the independent nation was denied to people
considered non-“white”. 15
During the colonial era subjecthood
naturalization was too costly for most aliens 16 , and after the American
Revolution citizenship by naturalization was denied to non-whites until
the mid twentieth century. 17 The exclusion of non-whites from the body

14. Virginia did not create a perfect social system in which black equaled slave and white
equaled free with no confusing middle ground. Virginia's racially based system of slavery was
created in the context of continuous racial mixing, legal anomalies, and recurrent attempts to patch
holes in the fabric of the system. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 11, at 1970. Mixed race
offspring of Europeans and Africans although called mulatto rather than negro, were nevertheless
classified as negro “in effect denying that intermixture had occurred at all.” WINTHROP JORDAN,
WHITE OVER BLACK: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550 TO 1812 177-78 (1968).
15. During the colonial era, “African slaves transported to the New World were for most
purposes regarded as chattels; neither they nor their children were counted as subjects, nor were
they aliens.” ANN DUMMETT & ANDREW NICOL, SUBJECTS, CITIZENS, ALIENS AND OTHERS:
NATIONALITY AND IMMIGRATION LAW 74 (1990). See also Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 419-20,
427 (1856) (black Americans); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (Native Americans).
Citizenship for Mexican Americans was contested. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 349 (W.D. Tex.
1897) (allowing the naturalization of a “pure-blooded Mexican” but remarking, “[i]f the strict
scientific classification of the anthropologist should be adopted, he would probably not be classed as
white”); IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 61 (1996)
(“The court allowed the applicant to naturalize on the basis of a series of treaties conferring
citizenship on Spaniards and Mexicans in the wake of U.S. expansion into Florida and the
Southwest.”). “Despite the admission of Rodriguez to citizenship, Mexicans in the Southwest
suffered considerable legal repression in the decades after the U.S. conquest of that region.” Id. at
n.36 (citing RODOLFO ACUNA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS (1988)); see also
George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American
Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555 (1994).
16. LAURA HUNT YUNGBLUT, STRANGERS SETTLED HERE AMONGST US: POLICIES,
PERCEPTIONS AND THE PRESENCE OF ALIENS IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 78 (1996). Naturalization
required an Act of Parliament and was very rare. Id; Lien Luu, Natural-Born Versus Stranger-Born
Subjects: Aliens and Their Status in Elizabethan London, in IMMIGRANTS IN TUDOR AND EARLY
STUART ENGLAND 72 (Nigel Goose & Lien Luu, eds., 2005). During the sixteenth century concerns
about over population in England in the face of increasing immigration from other parts of Europe
which worked against a statutory naturalization process. Id. at 72; DUMMETT & NICOL, supra note
15, at 71-72. “Commerce and colonial development were major factors in nationality and
immigration policy . . . Naturalisation was used . . . to encourage the settlement of people who
would benefit the economy. In the colonies of the New World, labour of every kind was in great
demand.” Id. at 71-72. But even with voluntary migration and generous naturalization laws during
the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries these policies were not sufficient to
attract voluntary labor from Europe. Id. at 72.
17. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (holding in all the Naturalization Acts
from 1790 to 1906 the privilege of Naturalization was confined to white persons, and the appellant,
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politic forced racial hybrids to assert the white aspect of their ancestry in
claiming full community membership. 18
After a brief discussion of English subjecthood in seventeen
century England and the American colonies I explore the legal theories
advanced in Elizabeth Key’s freedom suit to determine whether the
factors considered by the judging parties continue to have validity in
contemporary America. I conclude that treating Elizabeth’s claim only
as a challenge to slavery is problematic because seventeenth century
English judges, unfamiliar with modern slavery, were uncertain about
the applicable common law principles to apply. Villeinage – English
serfdom – was an imperfect analogy to African slavery; and even if
villeinage principles were applied to Elizabeth’s case the outcome would
have been unclear. In exploring why the Virginia General Assembly
agreed to consider Elizabeth’s claim, I argue it was influenced by
evolving notions of English subjecthood stemming from Calvin’s Case
decided two years after the founding of the Virginia Colony as well as
the uncertain status of Africans and their descendants in England.
II. ENGLISH SUBJECTHOOD IN THE SIXTEENTH AND EARLY SEVENTEEN
CENTURY
American notions about citizenship have their roots in the
understanding of English subjecthood, as it existed in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century. The early seventeenth century was an important
time in the development of subjecthood concepts in England. Notions of
nationhood in a society whose laws were grounded in feudal ideas of
subjecthood based on place of birth and mutual political obligation was
evolving. 19

in this case, was not Caucasian and therefore belonged entirely outside the zone on the negative
side).
18. Thus, litigation about racial status in this country ultimately goes to citizenship status.
Legal scholars like Ian Haney Lopez in limiting their discussions about the connection between
whiteness and citizenship to naturalization failed to appreciate how the rejection of native-born
racial hybrids as full citizens more fully explains the whiteness naturalization cases. See generally
LOPEZ, supra note 15.
19. Luu, supra note 16, at 59.
Besides the stranger’s [alien’s] relationship to the sovereign, there was also his place
within a town. Towns had extensive privileges bestowed by ancient charters. The key
differentiation among townsmen was . . . “the dividing line . . . between freemen and
non-freemen . . . Only freedmen could hold civic office and only freeman could vote in
municipal and parliamentary elections.”
Id. at 60 (quoting John Evans).
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When Scottish King James IV ascended to the English throne in
1603, uniting the Scottish and English crowns as King James I, the legal
status of his Scottish subjects was called into question. Calvin’s Case, 20
decided in 1608, specifically addressed the question of whether a child
born in Scotland during the Scottish king’s reign became a subject of the
English monarch upon King James’ ascension to the English throne. 21
This was an important question because property in England could only
be inherited by subjects of the English monarch. 22
Robert Calvin was born in Scotland some time after King James
ascended to the English throne. 23 Calvin’s guardians argued that he was
entitled to two estates in England from which he had been “forcibly
dispossessed.” 24 They brought suit on Calvin’s behalf for one estate in
the Chancery Court and for the second in the King’s Bench and the
defendants in each case answered that Calvin was an “alien” and thus
“unable to be seised of a freehold in England.” 25 Because of the
seriousness of the issue presented the cases were sent to the Exchequer
Chamber and an extraordinary assemblage of judges 26 with only two
dissents, Lord Coke writing for the majority concluded that anyone born
within the English King’s domain is a natural-born subject and thus
eligible to inherit land in England. 27
Lord “Coke’s reasoning [also] applied to the colonists, . . . . . . .

20. Calvin v. Smith, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.).
21. For a discussion of this case and its implications see, Polly J. Price, Natural Law and
Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73 (1997).
22. Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep at 405-06.
23. Price, supra note 21, at 81 (stating that Robert Calvin’s true name was Robert “Colville”
and he was born in Scotland after 1603).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 82; Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 380.
Whoever is born infra legeantiam, within the ligeance of King James of his kingdom of
Scotland, is alienigena, an alien born, as to the Kingdom of England: but Robert Calvin
was born at Edinburgh, within the ligeance of the King of his kingdom of Scotland;
therefore Robert Calvin is alienigena, an alien born, as to the kingdom of England.
Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 380.
26. Price, supra note 21, at 82 (explaining that the cases were heard by fourteen judges from
the King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, along with the Lord Chancellor and the Barons of
the Exchequer).
27. Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 407 (“Whosoever is born within the King’s power or protection, is
no alien: but Calvin was born under the King’s power and protection; ergo he is no alien”). In
essence, Calvin’s Case holds that the subjects of James are not aliens to each other, but they remain
separately ruled by separate parliaments. King James’s ascendency to the English Throne served to
unite both the Scottish and English crowns. Thus in a sense an Englishman would also be a
“Scottish subject” because he is the subject of a Scottish King.
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persons born outside of England who were born subject to the King
could . . . inherit property in England.” 28 The rule in Calvin’s Case,
anyone born within the territory of the sovereign is a subject of the
English monarch, became the common law rule, 29 but it was not the only
way to become an English subject. 30 Children born to English parents
outside the country became English subjects at birth, 31 others could
become naturalized subjects. 32 All others were aliens or denizens –
“adopted subjects,” with some, but not all, the rights and privileges of
English subjects. 33
Prior to Calvin’s Case questions arose over whether a child born in
England to alien parents is an English subject. This issue was resolved
by statute around 1604, which said that a child of alien parents born in
England is a denizen. 34 This statute was a reaction to the dominance of
foreign-born merchants in overseas trade from England who brought
their foreign-born wives with them, 35 and left unclear whether a child of

28. David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 794, 798 (1987).
29. Price, supra note 21, at 83. The rule was changed in 1981. Id. (citing the British
Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.)).
30. Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 399.
There be regularly (unless it be in special cases) three incidents to a subject born. 1.
That the parents be under the actual obedience of the King. 2. That the place of his birth
be within the King’s dominion. And, 3. The time of his birth is chiefly to be considered;
for he cannot be a subject born of one kingdom that was born under the ligeance of a
King of another kingdom, albeit afterwards one kingdom descend to the King of the
other.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 472 (2003) (discussing the case of Craw v.
Ramsey in which the King’s Bench held that the King could not naturalize persons unless through
the English Parliament).
33. Luu, supra note 16, at 59. Luu writes that denizenship was acquired through a patent
letter from the Crown which laid out the rights and privileges conferred on the individual grantee,
but “the letter of denization had a fundamental drawback: denizens could not inherit property, and
the transmission of this status . . . to . . . descendants depended on the terms of the grant.” Id.
34. Id. at 65-66.
35. Id. at 65.
[I]t was reported in 1576 that “sundry persons being strangers . . . have of purpose
brought over their wives from the parts beyond the seas, to be delivered with child
within this city and other places within this realm of England, and thereof do take special
testimonials thereby to win to those children the liberty that other Englishmen do enjoy.”
Id. But more importantly since only English subjects could inherit property, making English-born
children of foreign parents denizens, effectively limited their ability to accumulate and pass on
wealth from generation to generation. Id. at 59.
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one English parent born in England is an English subject (subject of the
monarch).
As the foregoing discussion suggests, seventeenth century England
was not a homogenous society. For example, persons of African
ancestry were numerous enough in London and Bristol that during an
economic downturn in 1596 Queen Elizabeth ordered them expelled
from her kingdom. 36 Despite the Queen’s edict Africans did not leave
England. By the early seventeenth century there were Africans in the
court of James I. 37 Initially in the seventeenth century Africans were
referred to as humans as opposed to chattel, but the terminology changed
in the latter part of that century 38
“In 1672 when the new Royal African Company was granted its
charter, official terminology began at last to reflect the reality of the
African’s chattel status.” 39 Over that century more Africans migrated to
or were enslaved and taken to England, and some were able to enter
occupations other than domestic service “slipping out of the stereotyped
role imposed on them by English society.” 40 Most of the immigrants
were males and some free Africans, aliens, married English women who,
according to some sources, gave birth to English children. 41 But in light

36. GRETCHEN HOLBROOK GERZINA, BLACK LONDON: LIFE BEFORE EMANCIPATION 3-4
(1995) (citing Acts of the Privy Council, xxvi, 1596-1597, 16, 20-21); JAMES WALVIN, BLACK AND
WHITE: THE NEGRO AND ENGLISH SOCIETY 16-30 (1973) (discussing the effect Africans had on
Britain in the 1600s and how “black” was viewed as African); Ali A. Mazrui, On The Concept of
“We Are All Africans”, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 88 (1963) (associating “black” with “African” and
discussing the tendency to refer to people as being from the continent of Africa).
37. The precise legal status of Africans in England is unclear, Paul Edwards and James
Walvin write:
many of them [were] freed from slavery when take by Scottish privateers from
Portuguese ships; [by] including numbers of black people in his retinue, the King was
following a European tradition going back to the court of the Holy Roman Emperor
Frederick II (1194-1250), by displaying exotic tokens of royal splendour [sic], but this in
turn raises more doubts about their precise status.
PAUL EDWARDS & JAMES WALVIN, BLACK PERSONALITIES IN THE ERA OF THE SLAVE TRADE 6
(1983). Initially their leaving was resisted by the noble families many served. Later as English
involvement with the slave trade increased, Africans and their descendants became economically
desirable commodities. Id.
38. JAMES WALVIN, BLACK AND WHITE: THE NEGRO AND ENGLISH SOCIETY 38 (1973).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 197 (citing The Records of the Church of Christ, 1640-87, ed. E.B. Underhill, for
Hanserd Knollys Society, London, 1847, 33-6: Parish Register of St. Andrews, Plymouth, 587).
41. Id. at 197. “In the process some of them were assimilated almost to the point of equality
with white Englishman, particularly in religious and sexual matters, but much depended on the
degree of freedom conceded to the Negro.” Id. (citing The Records of the Church of Christ, 164087, ed. E.B. Underhill, for Hanserd Knollys Society, London, 1847, 33-6: Parish Register of St.
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of the 1576 statute it is unclear whether Calvin’s Case made these
children of free African aliens born in England to English mothers
subjects of the monarch.
If subjecthood was dependent on the father’s subjecthood, then the
child of an alien father and English mother was at most a denizen.
Raymond Fagel reports that between 1509 and 1603 “some 80 children
born abroad to an English father and a mother from the Low Countries”
applied for denization or naturalization, suggesting that both parents
must be English for a child born outside the realm to be considered a
subject of the monarch at birth. 42 If, however, Calvin’s Case means that
the child of either an English mother or father born in the English realm
is an English subject, then a child of an African father and English
mother was presumptively an English subject. This reading of the case
would be significant since there is some suggestion that alien Africans
were not acceptable members of the English community. 43 Historian
James Walvin writes that with the intermarriage of African men and
English women: “[t]he overall process was thus one of absorption of the
Negroes into the poor white communities alongside which they had
always lived. The combined process of absorption and decline in

Andrews, Plymouth, 587). By the nineteenth century most of their descendants were absorbed “into
the poor white communities alongside which they had always lived[,] [t]he combined process of
absorption and decline in immigration.” Id. at 197. “In the absence of adequate numbers of black
women, Negroes in England settled down with white women. Their offspring were English, and
with further interracial breeding their pigmentation became lighter and increasingly less noticeable.”
Id.
42. Raymond Fagel, Immigrant Roots: The Geographical Origins of Newcomers from the
Low Countries in Tudor England, in IMMIGRANTS IN TUDOR AND EARLY STUART ENGLAND, supra
note 16, at 47.
43. Nigel Goose, ‘Xenophobia’ in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England: An Epithet Too
Far?, in IMMIGRANTS IN TUTOR AND EARLY STUART ENGLAND, supra note 16, at 125 (“The fact
that Elizabeth I took steps to reduce the number of ‘blackamoors’ in the capital in the late sixteenth
century is well known, and finds reflection in Cecil’s remark in the Commons in 1593 that it is “a
matter of Charity to relieve Strangers, and especially such as do not grieve our Eyes.”); EDWARDS &
WALVIN, supra note 37, at 6 (“Far from being slaves . . . the black people of James’s court were
possibly many of them freed from slavery when taken by Scottish privateers from Portuguese ships;
in including numbers of black people in his retinue, the King was following a European tradition
going back to the court of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (1194-1250), by displaying exotic
tokens of royal splendour [sic], but this in turn raises more doubts about their precise status”).
“By the time of the accession of George I, the economic importance of the Negro and chattel
slavery had resulted in a fundamental confusion in English law. On one hand, the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679 appeared to guarantee basic human rights. On the other, the black was viewed only as a
chattel and moveable property, as defined by the Navigation Acts.” Id. at 15 (citing W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926)).
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immigration rapidly proved to be effective solvents of English black
society.” 44
Given the uncertainty about how English birthright subjecthood
was acquired, the first charter of the Virginia Company issued by King
James in 1606 contained the following declaration:
[A]ll and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall dwell and
inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies and
Plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen to be born
within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said several Colonies and
Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises, and
Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all Intents and
Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realm
of England, or any other of our said Dominions. 45

The Charter’s declaration does not clarify whether to become a
subject of the English monarch at birth requires that both parents be
English subjects, or whether English subjecthood attaches if the child’s
father is English or if either parent is English. Arguably English
colonial subjecthood was dependent on a crown charter and subject to
the English parliament as well. Further, the charter states the
colonialists’ children born in the colony shall have the same privileges
as English subjects, which does not necessarily mean that they were
considered English subjects. As my discussion in the next section
indicates, Elizabeth’s legal theories seem based on the notion that a
father’s English ancestry confers English subjecthood or, at the very
least, those privileges of English subjects on an acknowledged child
born within the monarch’s realm.
III. ELIZABETH’S LEGAL THEORIES
A. Introduction
Elizabeth Key’s case against the Mottrom estate was heard before a
jury in the Northumberland County Court on January 20, 1655/56. 46

44. WALVIN, supra note 38, at 197.
45. Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 57-66.
46. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167; ADVENTURERS OF PURSE AND PERSON, VIRGINIA,
1607-1624/5, at xxiii (Virginia M. Meyer & John Frederick Dorman eds., 1987) (explaining that
until 1752 the Virginia colony used two calendars, the Julian calendar and the Gregorian calendar.
Since under the Julian calendar the New Year started March 25th, any event that occurred between
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After hearing all the evidence, the county court jury, a relatively recent
addition, 47 found that Elizabeth’s father was Thomas Key, a free
Englishman. 48 They also found, as a matter of fact, that Key bound
Elizabeth to Humphrey Higginson for a nine year term which had
expired. 49 Based on the jury’s factual findings, the County Court judge
ruled that Elizabeth ought to be freed. 50 The Mottrom estate overseers
appealed this decision to the General Court. 51
The General Court met in Jamestown 52 and had both original and
appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in the colony. 53 Elizabeth’s
case was heard at the March 1655/1656 session, but 54 the only existing
records of the General Court proceeding are the notes of Conway
Robinson. 55 Robinson reports only that “a mulatto held to be a slave
and appeal taken,” 56 in other words the General Court decided Elizabeth
was a slave, and she appealed. 57
Undeterred by the General Court’s adverse decision, Elizabeth
petitioned the General Assembly for a hearing. 58 Until 1680, the

January 1st and March 25th was indicated using two years).
47. Warren M. Billings, Pleading, Procedure, and Practice: The Meaning of Due Process of
Law in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 47 J. S. HIST. 569, 575, 581 (1981).
48. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 165.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. OLIVER P. CHITWOOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 37, 99 (1971). The General Court
usually met in the capital. Only on rare occasions did the court meet elsewhere, and there is nothing
to suggest that this was one of those rare occasions.
53. Id. at 17.
54. Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 469 n.9. The actual
court record was destroyed by fire in 1865. Id.
55. VIRGINIUS CORNICK HALL, JR., PORTRAITS IN THE COLLECTION OF VIRGINIA HISTORICAL
SOCIETY: A CATALOG 215 (1981). Conway Robinson was the founder of the Virginia Historical
Society and lived from 1805-1884. He also worked as a lawyer, author, and Clerk of the General
Court from 1828-1831. Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 469
n.9. Conway Robinson made copies of the colonial court records whose originals were later
destroyed in a fire during the Civil War.
56. H.R. MCILWAINE, MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 1622-1632, 1670-1676: WITH NOTES AND EXCERPTS FROM ORIGINAL COUNCIL AND
GENERAL COURT RECORDS, INTO 1683, NOW LOST 504 (1924); Billings, The Cases of Fernando
and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 469 n.9.
57. PHILIP A. BRUCE, INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA: IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
681-82 (1910). Because no record remains, it is impossible to determine whether the general court
retried the case, asserting its original jurisdiction, or acted as an appellate court, simply suspending
the county court order until it rendered a decision.
58. Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 468-69.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss3/5

12

Banks: Subjecthood and Racialized Identity in Colonial Virginia
BANKS_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:57 PM

SUBJECTHOOD AND RACIALIZED IDENTITY IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA

811

General Assembly was both the legislative body, and the highest
appellate court in the Virginia colony. 59 Upon receipt of Elizabeth’s
petition, the General Assembly appointed a committee of Burgesses to
investigate the matter. 60 Although there are no records to indicate the
nature of the Committee’s investigation, there is a report. The
Committee report essentially upholds the decision of the County Court. 61
One key to Elizabeth Key’s success lies in the theories she used to
assert her legal status as a free-born English subject. Her pleadings
differed materially from typical seventeenth century freedom suits in
several respects. Most seventeenth century freedom suits by English
indentured servants in Virginia usually alleged only that the complainant
is being held beyond the agreed upon years of service. 62 But this was
just one of the legal theories Elizabeth asserts in her freedom suit; and
the validity of that claim seems to rest on two other claims: first that she
was the daughter of Thomas Key, a free Englishman, which status she
inherited; 63 and second, that as a baptized practicing Christian she could
not be held in servitude for life. 64 Based on these two statuses – English
paternal ancestry and Christian religion – Elizabeth asserted that she
must be treated as an English indentured servant whose term of service
had expired.
In the typical freedom suit there would be no need for an English
servant to assert free birth since by the seventeenth century English men
and women were presumptively free. 65 Likewise the typical English
indentured servant would not have to assert her Christian belief since
Christianity also was presumed for English subjects. Evidently,
Elizabeth (or the person who drafted the pleadings) understood that her

59. PERCY SCOTT FLIPPIN, THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 1624-1775, in STUDIES IN
HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 307 (Columbia University Political Science Faculty ed.,
1919). At that time the General Court became the highest court in the colony and appeals from that
court were made to the Monarch.
60. Billings, The Case of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 469.
61. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167.
62. See George B. Curtis, The Colonial County Court, Social Forum and Legislative
Precedent: Accomack County, Virginia, 1633-1639, 85 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 274, 282
(1977).
63. William M. Wiecek, The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the Thirteen Mainland
Colonies of British America, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 258, 262 (1977).
64. See OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167 (“A Report of a Comittee [sic] from an
Assembly Concerning the freedome [sic] of Elizabeth Key.”).
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *423-24 (describing the attempted
introduction of slavery to England by statute in 1547 and its rapid repeal in 1549-1550).
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claim was atypical suggesting a sophisticated understanding of
community norms. 66 “In early America . . . women as well as men
spoke through ‘court records more openly than through almost any other
set of documents.’” 67
Thus to appreciate the novelty of Elizabeth’s case, her interlinking
legal claims merit further examination. They provide insight into the
legal and social status distinctions between English and African
descendants in colonial Virginia during the middle of the seventeenth
century. Each theory is problematic, perhaps foreshadowing the
difficulty the colonial legal system had with Elizabeth’s claims.
A more thorough examination of Elizabeth Key’s freedom suit is
important for another reason. There is a tendency to discuss slavery
from a male perspective giving enslaved women only secondary
positions in the struggle to secure freedom. More recent slave
scholarship suggests that we need to reconsider how the interaction of
race and gender often distinguishes black women’s struggles to define
themselves legally from similar attempts by white women and black
men. 68
B. Status of the Child Follows the Father (partus sequitur partem)
Elizabeth’s primary argument was that the child of a free English
man could not be born a slave. Although various forms of unfree
statuses existed in seventeenth century England, 69 as late as 1701 Sir
John Holt, Chief Justice of King’s Bench wrote: “One may be a villein

66. Ira Berlin, From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American
Society in Mainland North America, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 251, 252-54 (1996). This level of
sophistication is not normally attributed to negro slaves. Id. But as historian Ira Berlin writes,
during the colonial period “Atlantic creoles,” persons of African descent, had an understanding of
the society in which they found themselves and used this knowledge to their own advantage. Id. at
278.
67. TERRI L. SNYDER, BRABBLING WOMEN: DISORDERLY SPEECH AND THE LAW IN EARLY
VIRGINIA 7 (2003) (citing CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW
AND SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789 285-328 (1995)).
68. See Adrienne Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 457 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Cheryl I.
Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 309, 313-15 (1996); Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women’s History and
the Metalanguage of Race, 17 SIGNS 251, 252 (1992).
69. See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 1716-25.
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in England, but not a slave.” 70 Thus by asserting that her father was a
free Englishman, Elizabeth was arguing that she too was born free.
What is not clear is whether the legal status of her mother also
influenced the strength of her claim. Elizabeth’s mother is described in
the County Court proceeding as a negro woman 71 and as a slave in the
General Assembly committee report. 72 It is probable that in seventeenth
century Virginia there was no meaningful difference between a negro
and slave when describing a person with African ancestry. Otherwise if
her mother was an indentured servant, Elizabeth would be considered
free at birth even though she might subsequently be placed in temporary
servitude. Customarily, illegitimate children of female indentured
servants were placed into service to pay for their keep. 73
It also is likely that her mother was an alien, someone not born in
the British American Colonies or the English realm, given both the date
of Elizabeth’s birth, 1630 74 , and the small number of negroes in the
colonies at that time. 75 Thus Elizabeth’s claim to English subjecthood
rested on determining whether anyone born in the colony became an
English subject, or whether the child of an English subject and an alien
born on English territory became an English subject. As mentioned
previously, the Virginia Company Charter is unclear on this question. 76

70. Id. at 1716 (citing Smith v. Brown & Cooper, (1701) 2 Salk. 666, 91 Eng. Rep. 566
(K.B.)). A late sixteenth century tract asserts: “[a]s for slaves and bondmen we have none; nay such
is the privilege of our country . . . that if any come hither from other realms, so soon as they set foot
on land they become . . . free . . . ” Id. at 1715 (quoting WILLIAM HARRISON, THE DESCRIPTION OF
ENGLAND 134 (F. J. Furnivall ed., 1877)).
71. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Elizabeth Newman, stating that Key
was “fined for getting his Negro woman with Childe.”). Interestingly, although only the deposition
of Elizabeth Newman refers to Elizabeth’s mother, and Newman calls her a “Negro woman”, once,
as above, the article by Warren Billings, says that the “depositions refer to Elizabeth Key’s mother
as a slave.” Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 468 n.5.
72. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167 (“A Report of a Comittee [sic] from an Assembly
Concerning the freedome [sic] of Elizabeth Key”).
73. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 772 (1996); Veronica Hendrick, Codifying Humanity:
The Legal Line Between Slave and Servant, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 685, 688 (2007); Oscar &
Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the Southern Labor System, 7 WM. & MARY Q. 199, 201-02 (1950);
JOSEPH DOUGLAS DEAL, RACE AND CLASS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA: INDIANS, ENGLISHMEN, AND
AFRICANS ON THE EASTERN SHORE DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 166, 171 (1993).
74. See OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166.
75. See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 1735-38 (describing how England was “late” to the slave
trade, and how England used Bermuda, Barbados, and Jamaica for sugar cultivation in the
seventeenth century before turning to the slave trade).
76. The rights of English subjects are granted to the colonists’ children in section XV of the
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Assuming Elizabeth’s mother was a slave, it is possible that
customary practice in the colony in 1630 when Elizabeth was born
deemed her a slave. There is evidence that children of black slaves in
the Virginia colony were held as slaves. 77 In 1649 several black women
were sold as slaves together with their “issue and produce.” 78 Further,
in 1657 while Elizabeth was still litigating her case a white servant,
Thomas Twine, fathered a child by a black woman also described as a
servant. The record shows no fine, nor any arrangement for the child’s
upkeep causing at least one historian to infer that the child was held as a
slave by the mother’s master. 79
The colonial legislature did not address this question until 1662,
several years after Elizabeth’s case. That statute proclaims that the
status of the child follows the mother (partus sequitur ventrem). 80
Ultimately this becomes the rule in the slave-holding British American
colonies. 81 Thus one thing seems clear, Elizabeth’s case, and the
existence of other illegitimate offspring of Englishmen and African
descended women in the colony resulted in a policy decision by the
General Assembly about the fundamental status and rights of persons of
Afro-English ancestry. The need for legislation in this area reflects the
failure of English common law to provide a satisfactory resolution of the
issue.
“When English judges first confronted modern slavery in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as common lawyers they
instinctively turned to earlier legal forms of servitude [like villeinage]
for help in understanding the meaning of unfreedom.” 82 A villein was a
peasant or serf, and villeinage, when it existed, was the closest unfree

Charter of King James I of 1606. 1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 57, 64. The
King reiterates the statement of privileges in the Charter of 1609. Id. at 95.
77. DEAL, supra note 73, at 166-67 (discussing the case of Congo, Cossongo and their
children, who were held as slaves by members of the Littleton family for over forty years).
78. Winthrop D. Jordan, Modern Tensions and the Origins of American Slavery, 28 J. S. HIST.
18, 24 (1962). In one case, a Maryland man deeded two black men and one woman “and all their
issue” as slaves. Id. (emphasis added). But the record does not clearly indicate whether a child’s
slave status depended solely on the legal status of the child’s mother. In 1645, for example, a male
slave, Emanuel Driggus, had several children “bound” as servants to his master. The status or
ancestry of his children’s mother is unknown. DEAL, supra note 73, at 279-80. Later Driggus and
his wife, Frances (who was also a slave), had three children, all of whom were held as slaves. Id.
Driggus’s owner, Francis Pott, sold their children in the late 1650s. Id. at 283.
79. Brown, supra note 3, at 218-19.
80. Act XII of 1661, reprinted in Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 170.
81. Wiecek, supra note 63, at 262.
82. Wiecek, supra note 2, at 1715.
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state to slavery English society knew. 83 Villeins were considered chattel
to be bought and sold at will. 84 Villeins also could be freed by their
masters. 85
Nevertheless a comparison of the legal status of slaves with that of
villeins is an imperfect analogy because villeins had many rights that
slaves in America did not. Villeins could “hold real or personal
property,” marry without the master’s consent, carry arms and even
serve on juries. 86 “But with little else to go on, English lawyers
[nevertheless] cited villeinage, often inaccurately, as a legal precedent
that might help explain what it meant to be a slave.” 87
Applying the law of villeinage, the resolution of Elizabeth’s first
claim seems clear. In the fifteenth century, noted English jurist, Sir
Edward Coke, in one of the great treatises on the English common law,
the four volume Institutes of the Laws of England, wrote that if a
bondman or serf (villein) marries a free woman, their children would be
villeine, but if a bondwoman (niefe) married a free man, their children
would be free. 88 According to Lord Coke, the English common law
rule, that the status of the child follows the father, is grounded in the
notion of marital unity. 89 Under common law the legal identity and
status of a wife merged with that of her husband 90 ; they became one in

83. Id. at 1716.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1717.
86. Id.
In their legal status, they partook of the character of slaves on the one hand, and free
people on the other . . . The villein, . . . in theory, had not rights against the lord, while
the lord could exact special payments from him, such as a fee when a villein’s daughter
was married . . . Yet in other respects, the villein was free.
Id. at 1716-17.
87. Id. at 1718.
88. 1 LORD COKE, A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE’S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 322, § 187.123a (J.H. Thomas ed., 1836) [hereinafter COKE’S FIRST
INSTITUTE]. “[I]f a villain taketh a free woman to wife, and have issue between them, the issues
shall be villains. But if a nief [bondwoman] taketh a free man to her husband, their issue shall be
free.” Id.
89. Id. at 323, § 187.123a. “The husband and wife are all one person in law, and the nief
marrying a free man is enfranchised during the coverture . . . and therefore by the common law of
England the issue is free . . . ” Id.
90. See also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 442 (“By marriage, the husband and wife are
one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage . . . ”).
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the eyes of the law, and that one was the husband. 91 Therefore, the legal
status of the father naturally governs the legal status of the child. In this
respect English common law was different from civil law countries
where the status of the child follows the mother. 92
But Lord Coke’s statement only governs the status of a legitimate
child of a freeman and bondwoman. At the time of Elizabeth’s birth,
Thomas Key was not married to her mother, so Elizabeth was
“illegitimate” in the eyes of the law. Thus this common law rule does
not apply in her case. One must look further to determine what common
law rule applied to a child born to an unwed freeman and bondwoman.
A later section of Lord Coke’s The First Institute squarely
addresses this issue. Coke acknowledges that some judges have
mistakenly held that an “illegitimate” child of a bondwoman is a villeine,
and thus unfree. The correct rule, he writes, is that a child born to
unwed parents is a child of no one (quasi nullius filius), because the
child cannot be heir to anyone. 93 Thus this child is not a villeine unless
the child places her/himself in bond before a court. 94 Applying Lord
Coke’s interpretation of the English common law, Elizabeth would be
free-born under English law, even though her mother was a slave.
Whether the Virginia colonists understood this to be the common
law of England, and thus applicable to the colony is unclear. 95 They had
limited access to the full range of legal materials on this subject. The
few case reports by Sir Edward Coke found in colonial inventories were

91. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining
the common law rule).
92. “[T]his is contrary to the civil law; for there it is said, partus sequitur ventrem.” COKE’S
FIRST INSTITUTE, supra note 88, at 322, § 187.123a. However, “[t]he feudal institution of
villeinage, for which abundant legal precedent existed, provided the most likely candidate for being
the ancestor of slavery, but judges eventually discarded it as irrelevant.” Wiecek, supra note 2, at
1716.
93. COKE’S FIRST INSTITUTE, supra note 88, at 324, § 188.123a.
94. Id. (“[N]o bastard may be a villain, unless he will acknowledge himself to be a villain in a
court of record; for he is in law quasi nullius filius [a child of no one], because he cannot be heir to
any”).
95. Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2083 n.91 (1993). Some
scholars argue that the 1662 statute reflected “an attempt to regulate the emerging social and
economic institution of slavery in a way that would be most beneficial to the master.” Id. (citing
EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 333 (1975); Thomas D. Morris, “Villeinage as It Existed in England, Reflects but Little
Light on Our Subject:” The Problem of the “Sources” of Southern Slave Law, 32 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 95, 112-13 (1988); Wiecek, supra note 63, at 262-63).
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written in French. 96 The first English version of Coke’s reports was not
available in the colony before 1658, the year after Elizabeth’s case was
resolved. 97 Therefore, it is unclear whether Lord Coke’s interpretations
on this point were readily available to all actors in the colonial legal
institutions of the period. Undoubtedly, some of the men who judged
Elizabeth’s case were familiar with English common law as recorded by
Lord Coke; whether they felt bound to follow the law when an Anglonegro was involved is another question altogether.
On the other hand, Henry Swinburne’s legal treatise, A Briefe
Treatise of Testaments And Last Willes, published in 1590, was widely
used in the colony during the seventeenth century. 98 Written in English,
it was readily understandable by any literate person. 99 In fact, a copy of
Swinburne’s treatise appears among the inventory of John Mottrom’s
estate. 100
Swinburne agreed with Lord Coke that under the common law the
father’s status governed the legal status of legitimate children whose
parents had different legal status. As for children born outside of
marriage, Swinburne writes:
[A] bastard shall not be bound though the father were a bond-slave,
because the lawe dooth not acknowledge any father in this case . . . .
But howsoever the civill lawe and the laws of this realme differ in this,
whether the bondage of the father or of the mother, doo make the
childe bonde: Yet in this they doo agree, that a bond-man can not make
a testament [will]. 101

Arguably, Swinburne is silent, or at the very least ambiguous, on
whether an illegitimate child inherits the legal status of its mother. All
he says is that an illegitimate child does not inherit the legal status of its
alleged father. Thus according to Swinburne the legitimacy of
Elizabeth’s claim of free birth is questionable.
Blackstone’s Commentaries, another written authoritative source on

96. Warren M. Billings, Justice, Books, Laws, and Courts in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,
85 LAW LIBR. J. 277, 284 (1993).
97. Id.
98. HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS (1590) (photo.
reprint 1978).
99. Billings, supra note 96, at 287-88.
100. Inventory of the Estate of JNO Mottrom, in NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY RECORD BOOK,
1652-1658 98 (Frank V. Walczyk ed., 2001).
101. SWINBURNE, supra note 98, at 44.
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English common law, published well after Elizabeth’s case, is in full
agreement on every point with Lord Coke’s interpretation of the law.
Blackstone reasons that because a bastard under law cannot inherit, it
would be “hard that he should lose his natural freedom by it.” 102 Thus,
under Blackstone’s interpretation of English common law Elizabeth
would be considered free at birth. Blackstone’s conclusion also is
consistent with judicial commentary elsewhere in the colonies.
The New England colonies considered the offspring of slaves born
free until 1670 when the Massachusetts colony revised its law on
slavery. 103 The need for a law on this point suggests that more educated
English colonists understood that at common law an English child born
to unwed parents was presumed to be free. The status of children with
Anglo-African ancestry was not formally resolved in Connecticut until
1704 when the General Assembly in Abda v. Richards said that a child’s
status follows that of the mother. 104 In that case Abda, who like
Elizabeth Key, had a white father and an enslaved negro mother,
challenged his enslavement asserting his white ancestry. 105
The Connecticut General Assembly admitted that no law
specifically covered persons of mixed ancestry, and that their ruling
simply reflected “customary practice.” 106 According to historian
Lorenzo Greene, Abda set a legal precedent in New England. 107 Thus,
by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the universal practice was
that children of enslaved women in the British American colonies were
born into perpetual slavery. 108
Since Elizabeth’s claim to freedom hinged on whether her father
was a free English man, the first hurdle in the County Court was to
establish that she was the daughter of Thomas Key. During the initial
trial there was conflicting testimony on this issue. One witness claimed
that Elizabeth’s father was a “Turke.” 109 Slavery was not limited to

102. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 94.
103. Massachusetts legalized slavery in 1641, but did not resolve the issue of whether slavery
was hereditary until 1670. LORENZO J. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 16201776 290, 322 (1942).
104. Id. at 182-83.
105. Also like the Key case, the Inferior Court of Common Pleas agreed with him, but the
General Assembly reversed. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Davis, supra note 68, at 459 (stating that all the colonies had adopted the rule by 1682).
109. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166. One witness testified that sixteen or seventeen
years earlier he heard “a flying report” (rumors) in Yorke that Elizabeth was the child of Thomas
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negroes 110 , thus English ancestry, might have been crucial in
establishing Elizabeth’s first claim. But, if the court applied English law
coming out of villeinage then it would not matter whether her father was
a free Englishman or a Turke, unless the free birth rule only applied to
the children of English men and women. Elizabeth was born outside of
a lawful marriage, and as a child of no one, she would be free.
Another witness swore that nineteen years earlier neighbors of
Elizabeth’s first master commonly reported that she was Thomas Key’s
child. 111 But the most persuasive evidence came from the eighty-year
old former servant of John Mottrom who testified that it was commonly
known that Thomas Key had been fined by the court in Blunt Point for
getting “his Negro woman with Childe,” and that child was Elizabeth. 112
Her testimony was corroborated by two other witnesses. 113

Key. Id. (Testimony of Nicholas Jurnew). According to this witness, Thomas Key reportedly
denied it, claiming that a “Turke of Capt. Mathewes” was Elizabeth’s father. Id.; John H. Wigmore,
The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 444-45 (1904). Most contemporary
lawyers would cringe at Jurnew’s testimony since he is reporting a rumor, notoriously unreliable
evidence - hearsay. The hearsay rule, which prevents this type of testimony from being admitted as
evidence in modern trials, was not very well developed in the mid-seventeenth century. Wigmore,
supra, at 444-45. Noting that “down beyond the middle of the 1600’s” hearsay evidence was
“constantly received” in courts, “even against opposition.” Id. at 444. It was only “between 1675
and 1690 that the fixing of the [hearsay] doctrine takes place.” Id. at 445. Further, county court
judges with little or no legal training were not likely to apply such highly formal rules of evidence.
If Elizabeth’s father was a Turk, then her claim of free birth based on her father’s status might fail,
especially if English ancestry created a presumption of free birth. This testimony, if believed by the
jury, would be significant because in 1655, a “Turke” was neither a free English man, nor a
Christian. Liam Seamus O’Melinn, The Imperial Origins of Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of
Colonization in Britain, Ireland, and America, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1207, 1248 (1999) (explaining the
English use of the term “Turk” to describe those who were “adherents of Islam”); see also the
Virginia Act of 1705, reprinted in 3 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 447-48
(explaining that “Turks and Moors in amity with her majesty” would not be enslaved. Before that
law, the status of such Turkes was unclear).
110. David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of “Jim Crow:” A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis
of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 133, 139 (1994) (stating that slavery
was not limited to Africans, but also included “people of any race who bore the badges and
incidents of a status which made them ‘pariah’ in the eyes of the majority”). Note also that Native
Americans were briefly enslaved in the British American colonies. See Jonathan L. Alpert, The
Origin of Slavery in the United States – the Maryland Precedent, 14 Am. J. Legal Hist. 189, 191
(1970) (regarding Indian slaves in Maryland in 1640). Some Indians were enslaved in Virginia
between the years of 1676 and 1691. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham,
“Yearning to Breathe Free”: Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum
Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1238 n.136 (1993).
111. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166.
112. Id.
113. Id. The first witness testified that he heard Elizabeth referred to in the Mottrom
household as Thomas Key’s “bastard,” adding that when Thomas Key’s son, John, called Elizabeth
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Although there was substantial hearsay evidence in support of
Elizabeth’s claim, no direct evidence established that Thomas Key was
Elizabeth’s father. Nevertheless the jury concluded that Elizabeth was
Thomas Key’s daughter. 114 With paternity established the next question
was whether her father’s status as a free Englishman meant that
Elizabeth was an English subject and thus free-born.
C. Indentured Servant versus Slave
Elizabeth’s status in her master’s household seemed a crucial
determinant of her legal status. Elizabeth claimed that she was given to
her godfather Humphrey Higginson at age six as an indentured servant.
Higginson, among the wealthiest and most influential settlers in the
colony during the 1640s, 115 left for England sometime in the 1650s and
never returned. 116 At some point before 1655 he transferred possession

“Black Bess,” John was instructed by Mrs. Speke to call her sister, which he did. Id. (testimony of
John Bayles). It is unclear from the record whether Mrs. Speke is related to Thomas Speke, one of
the overseers to the Mottrom estate who appealed the judgment to the General Court. Id. at 165. In
a more formal court proceeding Elizabeth generally would be required to produce Mrs. Speke to get
this statement before the court. However, given that the Mrs. Speke referred to by Bayles probably
was the wife of Thomas Speke, one of the overseers to the Mottrom estate, her willingness to testify
on Elizabeth’s behalf is doubtful. This likelihood might explain why Bayles, rather than Mrs.
Speke, the person whose words he repeats, testified on Elizabeth’s behalf. An exception to the
hearsay rule allows third party testimony about the out-of-court statements of a party opponent or
his agent. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1078 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 4th ed. 1972) (explaining
that the wife of the party to the suit might have been considered his agent). However, it is more
likely the testimony was admitted because of general laxity regarding hearsay evidence in the
colonial court. See Wigmore, supra note 109, at 444-45. The second corroborating witness testified
that she saw Elizabeth’s mother go to bed with Thomas Key many times, and heard Elizabeth’s
mother say that Elizabeth was Thomas Key’s child. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166
(testimony of Alice Larrett).
114. Id. at 165.
115. Bernard Family, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 181, 186 n.3 (1897). Humphrey Higginson was a
member of the Virginia Council from 1642-1655.
Id.; 2 PHILIP ALEXANDER BRUCE,
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 358-59 (1964). Philip
Alexander Bruce characterizes Council members as “invariably” among “the wealthiest . . . and
most influential” settlers in the colony. Id. at 358. A royal appointment, membership in the Council
of State, was one of the most influential positions in colonial Virginia. The Council exercised
powers roughly analogous to the English House of Lords. It had the right to approve or disapprove
all measures proposed by the colonial governor. Council members, already wealthy men, usually
grew much richer during their term of office. Id. at 359.
116. 2 BRUCE, supra note 115, at 382 n.2. In 1656 Higginson attempted to retain his
exemption from certain taxes, but the General Assembly refused to continue the exemption because
he had “been so long absent out of the country.” Id. But cf. The Randolph Manuscript: Virginia
Seventeenth Century Records, 17 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 113, 128 n.6 (1909) (explaining
that Higginson died in England in 1665).
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of Elizabeth to John Mottrom. Her transfer from one master to another
was not unusual.
Whether enslaved or indentured, unfree members of the Virginia
colony had no control over such transfers. According to historian
Douglas Deal, a slave in seventeenth century Virginia might belong to
three or four different owners. 117 Although indentured servitude was
temporary and not inheritable, in many respects servitude was
indistinguishable from slavery, 118 masters treated indentured servants
like land or chattel, selling or gambling them away at will. 119 Perhaps
for this reason some colonial courts appeared willing to hear servants’
complaints. 120
Three quarters of the servants who sued their masters in the
Chesapeake area (Maryland and Virginia) during the seventeenth
century won their case. 121 Notwithstanding this high rate of success,
since the burden fell on the servant to initiate legal action many servants
understandably were reluctant to sue for their freedom. 122 Despite the
availability of legal recourse, servants had great difficulty asserting their
legal rights, and challenging their ill treatment. The courts provided
little real protection generally permitting abuses that would not have

117. DEAL, supra note 73, at 178.
118. Wiecek, supra note 2, at 1720-21. See also MORGAN, supra note 95, at 127-29 (referring
to treatment of servants during the boom period).
119. MORGAN, supra note 95, at 127-29.
120. Curtis, supra note 62, at 282. The county court also certified the sale and transfer of two
servants under indenture agreements, and heard a series of cases involving the rental or lease of six
servants. Id. The leasing of servants, however, was unusual. Id.
121. MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE
FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 133 (1996). In contrast, servants in New England were less likely
to secure their freedom. Id. at 113 n.80. The life of a servant in seventeenth century Virginia was
harsh. Few servants would willingly continue after their contract for service had expired. Historian
Edmund Morgan points out that indentured servants in the Virginia colony served longer terms than
their counterparts in England. Unlike their English counterparts Virginia servants received no wages
because their wages had been paid in advance to cover their transportation costs to the colony.
Almost all servants were therefore in a condition resembling that of the least privileged type of
English servant, the parish apprentice, a child who (to relieve the community of supporting him)
was bound to service by court order, until he was twenty-one or twenty-four, with no obligation on
his appointed master’s part to teach him a trade or pay him. MORGAN, supra note 95, at 126.
122. If they lost they went back to masters angry at both the cost of the litigation and the cheek
or impudence of the servant in suing. Since the consequences of an unsuccessful freedom suit
might be severe, legal actions by servants against their masters probably were not initiated lightly.
See Higginbotham & Higginbotham, supra note 110, at 1234-36 (discussing “freedom suits”);
Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves, supra note 2, at 52.
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been allowed in England. 123 This lack of actual legal protection made an
indentured servant extremely vulnerable. 124 If the servant’s master died,
“an heir, real or fraudulent, would quickly lay hold of him.” 125
Assuming Elizabeth was an indentured servant, the extension of her
service beyond the original term and transfer from one master to another
were consistent with the treatment of English servants during the period.
The conversion of Elizabeth from indentured servant to slave was a
logical step given her ancestry. Her African ancestry made it easier for
the Mottrom estate overseers to argue that Elizabeth was a servant for
life – a slave.
At the trial Elizabeth produced witnesses who sought to explain the
nature of her transfer from Thomas Key to Humphrey Higginson. One
witness testified that according to neighbors, Elizabeth was given to
Higginson with the understanding that he would transport her to England
and deliver her to Thomas Key in nine years. When Thomas Key died
before the nine year term expired, the neighbors reported that Higginson
said he would take her to England anyway, “give her a portion and lett
her shift for her selfe.” 126
Another witness present at the signing of the agreement between
Thomas Key and Higginson testified that Higginson promised Key to
use “Bess a Molletto . . . as well as if shee were his own Child.” 127 This
testimony is corroborated by a written memorandum of the agreement
between Key and Higginson. According to the document described in
the record, in exchange for food and clothing, Elizabeth, a “Negro
Girle,” was being put in Higginson’s care for nine years. 128 The
memorandum further provided that if Higginson left permanently for
England before the nine year term expired, he should take Elizabeth with
him at his own expense, and not give her to anyone else. The agreement

123. MORGAN, supra note 95, at 127-28.
124. Sexual harassment of female, and occasionally male, servants was common. Id. at 129;
see also DEAL, supra note 73, at 127-28.
125. MORGAN, supra note 95, at 116.
126. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 166 (Testimony of Anthony Lenton).
127. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167 (Testimony of Anne Clark). Anne Clark testified
that she was present when Higginson and Thomas Key signed an agreement witnessed by her
deceased husband. Id. Having witnessed only the signing, Clark does not necessarily have firsthand knowledge of the agreement’s terms. Id. She is uncertain whether the document specified that
Elizabeth was to be given her freedom when her term expired. Id. at 166-67.
128. Id. at 165.
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also stipulated that Elizabeth should be freed if Higginson died before
the nine year term ended. 129
The whereabouts of the actual document are unknown. All that is
left is what the record says about the document. 130 This record raises
several questions about whether the document was an indenture contract
or a manumission agreement. If an indenture contract, the document
was evidence of Thomas Key’s intent to place Elizabeth in temporary
servitude. On the other hand, the document could be evidence that Key
intended to manumit her in nine years, supporting claims that Thomas
Key considered Elizabeth a slave. 131
Thus, the description of this memorandum does not clearly convey
whether Thomas Key considered Elizabeth born free or enslaved.
Whatever Elizabeth’s legal status at the time of the agreement, clearly
Key wanted Elizabeth freed at age fifteen, and Higginson broke his
promise to set her free. Elizabeth’s nine year term of service should
have ended in 1645, yet Higginson did not free her before he left for
England in the late 1640s or early 1650s. Higginson may have sold
Elizabeth to Mottrom directly since it is likely that the two knew each
other since their terms in the colonial legislature overlapped. 132
Higginson’s failure to honor the terms of his agreement with
Thomas Key was not unusual. For this very reason Virginia colonial
law required registration of indenture contracts to prevent masters from
holding servants beyond their agreed term of service. 133 It is likely that

129. Id.
130. Id. at 165, 169 (discussing the agreement and commenting on the destruction of General
Court records for the period of Elizabeth Key and Fernando’s trials).
131. See generally Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and
Cultures of Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2001) (describing
and contrasting the different approaches to manumission in the slave colonies).
132. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, JULY 30, 1619- JANUARY 11, 1978: A
BICENTENNIAL REGISTER OF MEMBERS 29 (Cynthia Miller Leonard ed., 1978). Mottrom served in
the House of Burgesses in 1652 session for Northumberland County. Id. This also means that he
and Higginson served in the general assembly together for one year, 1652, which makes it possible
that they knew one another.
133. A 1643 Virginia law provided:
WHEREAS divers controversies have risen between masters and servants being brought
into the collony without indentures ... Be it therefore enacted ... that such servants as
shall be imported haveing no indentures or covenants either men or women if they be
above twenty year old to serve fowre year, if they shall be above twelve and vnder
twenty to serve five years, and if under twelve to serve seaven years.
1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 257. Warren Billings writes, “[r]equiring the
recordation of indentures and servants’ ages guarded against the unscrupulous owner who might try
to extend the time of bondage.” Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves, supra note 2, at 51.
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Thomas Key, pursuant to this law, registered Elizabeth’s contract, and
this would explain why she had access to the memorandum.
D. Christianity as a Marker of Free Status
Sandwiched between the comments about the identity of her father,
and the nature of the agreement between Thomas Key and Humphrey
Higginson, is a statement about Elizabeth’s Christian beliefs. The
General Assembly committee report states that Elizabeth was the
christened godchild of Colonel Higginson, and seemed knowledgeable
about the tenets of her faith, 134 but the report provides little insight into
the weight, if any, the Committee placed on Elizabeth’s claim that a
Christian could not be held as a slave. Whether black Christians could
be held as slaves was a contentious issue, and one which the Committee
did not have to answer in Elizabeth’s case.
This uncertainty about the compatibility of slavery and Christianity
has its roots in English villeinage. Christianity was a prominent factor in
the end of villeinage in England. 135 During the seventeenth century
European jurists continued to debate whether Christians should hold
other Christians as slaves. 136 Nevertheless this debate did not prevent
Christians in Europe from killing or enslaving other Christians. 137
The claim that Christians could not be enslaved for life was used
earlier with limited success by African descended litigants to escape
slavery. For a time in the early seventeenth century customary practice
in Virginia may have afforded different status to blacks who were
Christians. There is some evidence that black Christians could testify
against whites, 138 and sue in court. 139 A free black Christian man was
able to purchase his “illegitimate” child with a black slave because he

However, Alden Vaughan argues that the 1643 statute only applied to English servants and did not
apply to persons of African ancestry, citing a subsequent 1655 statute, imposing longer terms for
Irish than English servants, which stated that the 1643 statute was “only [for] the benefitt of our
own nation.” Alden T. Vaughan, The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century
Virginia, 97 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 311, 340 n.87 (1989).
134. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167.
135. JORDAN, supra note 14, at 50.
136. Alan Watson, Seventeenth-Century Jurists, Roman Law, and the Law of Slavery, in
SLAVERY AND THE LAW 367, 374-76 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
137. Id. at 374.
138. Finkelman, supra note 95, at 2072 (discussing the testimony of a black Christian, John
Phillip, in 1624). According to Finkelman, Mr. Phillip was probably “fully assimilated into AngloAmerican society” having been baptized as a Christian twelve years earlier in England. Id.
139. JOSEPH BOSKIN, INTO SLAVERY: RACIAL DECISIONS IN THE VIRGINIA COLONY 41 (1976).
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promised to raise the child as a Christian. 140 More importantly, there is
some evidence that black Christians could not be held in servitude for
life. 141
Historian Joseph Boskin mentions a mulatto named Manuel who
was baptized and subsequently purchased as a slave by William
Whittaker, later a member in the House of Burgesses. 142 In 1644 the
General Assembly ruled that Manuel was not a slave, but ordered him
“[to] serve as other Christian servants do,” suggesting a term of
indenture. 143 Manuel’s term of service, however, was twenty-one years,
considerably longer than the usual term served by English servants. 144
Thus, while black Christians sometimes might escape perpetual
servitude, they served longer terms than English indentured servants,
suggesting that baptism did not confer equal status with English
servants. Thus English subjecthood more than religious belief was a
decisive factor, in Elizabeth’s case, Christian belief and practice simply
reinforced her claim of English subjecthood.
Elizabeth’s testimony about her Christian baptism and adherence to
her faith may have helped her avoid permanent servitude, but Christian
baptism alone would not have resulted in her immediate freedom. By
the time of her lawsuit, Elizabeth had been a servant for approximately
nineteen years, ten years beyond the nine years term she claimed, but not
the twenty-one years of service imposed on Manuel by the General

140. Finkelman, supra note 95, at 2073.
141. Warren Billings and others suggest that, for a time, customary practice in Virginia may
have afforded a different status to negroes who were practicing Christians, including the right not to
be held in servitude for life. Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at
469-70. Billings asserts that there must have been other lawsuits which raised this issue, reasoning
that “[i]t is highly unlikely that the Assembly would have needed to outlaw suits which seldom
occurred.” Id. at 470. According to Billings the only two known lawsuits, however, are those filed
by Elizabeth Key in 1655 and by Fernando in 1667. Id. Billings also notes the close proximity
between Fernando’s lawsuit in August and the enactment of the statute in September. Id. He also
cites an article by Alden T. Vaughan, Blacks in Virginia: A Note on the First Decade, 29 WM. &
MARY Q. 469, 478 (1972), as suggesting that conversion to Christianity conferred certain rights
upon blacks, including the right to be treated as an indentured servant as opposed to a slave.
Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 470 n.16. Historian Edmund
Morgan agrees that before 1660 it was assumed that Christianity and slavery were incompatible,
although he admits that “in Virginia [there always had been] a rough congruity of Christianity,
whiteness, and freedom and of heathenism, non-whiteness, and slavery.” MORGAN, supra note 95,
at 331-32. Morgan cites a 1662 General Assembly order to release a Powhattan Indian enslaved for
life who was “speaking perfectly the English tongue and desiring baptism.” Id. at 331.
142. BOSKIN, supra note 139, at 41.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Assembly. So, even if Elizabeth prevailed on this legal theory, she still
would owe approximately two more years of service to the Mottrom
estate.
In 1664, a few years after Elizabeth’s suit, Maryland slave owners
succeeded in getting a law enacted saying that Christian baptism had no
effect on a slave’s status. 145 The legislative body in that colony
rationalized that giving freedom to baptized slaves would cause slave
owners to work against religion! 146 Similar reasoning might also apply
in the Virginia colony as well, but the issue was not directly addressed
for three more years.
In 1667 a negro slave named Fernando brought a freedom suit in
the Lower Norfolk County Court alleging that he was a Christian, had
lived in England and had lived as a freeman, and thus could not be held
as a slave. 147 The County Court ruled against him, saying that Fernando
is “pretending hee was a Christian.” 148 Perhaps the most damning

145. An Act Concerning Negroes & Other Slaves, 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS
ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 533-34 (William Hand Browne ed., 1883)
[hereinafter 1 MD. ARCHIVES] (explaining that this statute did not explicitly mention slaves’
religion, but it was enacted in response to concerns of slaveholders that they would have to free
Christian slaves. It deemed “all Negroes . . . already within the province [a]nd all Negroes and
other slaves to bee [sic] hereafter imported” and “all Children born of any Negro” as slaves for life).
A statute expressly handling the issue of baptism and manumission was enacted in Maryland in
1671. See An Act for the Encourageing the Importation of Negroes and Slaves into this Province, 2
ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND
272 (William Hand Browne ed., 1884) [hereinafter 2 MD. ARCHIVES].
146. The lower house of the Maryland legislature requested the Upper House to write the 1664
law:
Itt is desired by the lower howse that the vpper howse would be pleased to drawe vp an
Act obligeing negros to serve durante vita they thinking itt very necessary for the
prevencon of the damage Masters of such Slaves may susteyne by such Slaves ptending
to be Christned And soe pleade the lawe of England Wherevpon was drawne vp an Act
intituled An Act for Slaves, and ordered to be sent to the lower howse.
1 MD. ARCHIVES, supra note 145, at 526. But the law was not enough for the slaveholders, who
sought and received another law to clarify that their religious duties did not interfere with their
slaveholding:
[Persons who have] Imported or purchased any such Negroes or Slaues haue to the great
displeasure of Almighty God and the prejudice of the Soules of those poore people
Neglected to instruct them in the Christian faith or to Endure or permitt them to Receive
the holy Sacrament of Babtisme for the Remission of their Sinns upon a mistake and
vngrounded apprehension that by becoming Christians they and the Issues of their bodies
are actually manumited and made free and discharged from their Servitude and bondage.
2 MD. ARCHIVES, supra note 145, at 272.
147. Billings, The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key, supra note 2, at 467-68.
148. LOWER NORFOLK COUNTY ORDER BOOK, 1666-1675, reprinted in OLD DOMINION, supra
note 1, at 169 (record of Fernando’s case in 1667).
AND
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evidence, in the court’s mind, was the papers Fernando submitted to the
court in support of his claim of Christian birth, they were written in a
foreign language, probably Spanish or Portuguese, which the court could
not understand. If Christianity was seen as just another component of
English subjecthood, then any linkage between his case and that of
Elizabeth Key decided almost a decade earlier is an imperfect analogy.
Mixed race status and Christian belief were not determinative; it was
English subjecthood that mattered. 149 But the fact that the County Court
entertains this freedom suit by a negro slave, rather than dismissing it
outright, suggests some uncertainty about whether practicing Christian
negroes could be held as slaves.
In 1667, shortly after Fernando’s case, the General Assembly
enacted a law resolving the issue and declaring that baptism of a slave
does not change the legal status of that person. 150 But this law only
covered slaves who converted to Christianity after entering the colony,
not to those slaves baptized prior to their entry into the colony, a later
This question remained unsettled in
statute closed this gap. 151
England. 152
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE DISPOSITION OF ELIZABETH’S CASE
The cumulative effect of finding the mixed-race Elizabeth the

149. Id. at 169. Fernando appealed his case to the General Court, but the outcome is unknown
because the records have been destroyed.
150. The statute reads: “An act declaring that baptisme of slaves doth not exempt them from
bondage.” 2 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 260.
151. Finkelman writes:
In 1682 Virginia again attempted to settle the whole problem of race and religion. An act
of that year stated that all “Negroes, Moors, Mollattoes or Indians, who and whose
parentage and native country are not christian at the time of their first purchase of such
servant by some christian” should be converted when brought to Virginia, but that they
would remain slaves for life.
Finkelman, supra note 95, at 2075 (citing An Act to Repeale a Former Law Making Indians and
Others Free (Nov. 1682), reprinted in 2 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 490, 491).
152. In Butts v. Penny the King’s Bench held that an action of trover would lie for one hundred
African slaves claimed by the plaintiff. Butts v. Penny, (1677) 2 Lev. 201, 83 Eng. Rep. 518 (K.B.).
The court in describing Africans said that Africans were “usually . . . bought and sold in America as
merchandise, by the custom of merchants.” Id. In recognizing the chattel character of slavery, the
court legitimated it in English law by asserting that Africans were “infidels.” Id. At least they were
“until they bec[ome] Christians.” Butts v. Penny, (1677) 3 Keble 785, 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (K.B.).
The meaning of this dictum (all the slaves in this case were non-Christians) is unclear, and Butts
proved to be an unstable precedent. The King’s Bench rejected it twenty years later in Chamberline
v. Harvey, (1697) 1 Ld. Raym. 146, 91 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B.).
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Christian child of a free Englishman coupled with written evidence
supporting her claim that she was an indentured servant or at least
entitled to be freed, may have been significant. Each factor is a marker
of Englishness used during this period to distinguish free from unfree
persons. Perhaps once her English paternity is established, the other
factors made Elizabeth seem more like an Englishwoman, an English
subject, than a negro slave.
What is significant is that the General Assembly Committee
squarely addressed Elizabeth’s claim that the daughter of a free
Englishman and a negro female slave was free-born. This was a
potentially divisive issue in a community desperate for labor. The harsh
conditions in the Virginia colony were becoming more widely known in
England. Historian Warren Billings writes: “The colony had acquired a
justly deserved reputation as a deathtrap during the years of the Virginia
Company. Promoters, try as they might, never entirely shook that image
with their portrayals of Virginia as a fabulous new Eden.” 153 As a
result, by the mid-seventeenth century it was harder to entice strong
young English settlers to come as indentured servants. 154 By this time
some planters must have been seriously considering substituting black
slaves for English indentured servants.
Further, the number of children being born outside of marriage was
increasing, much to the dismay of colony leaders. Sexual promiscuity
within the colony was rampant. 155 Given the shortage of English women
in the Virginia colony, and the large number of single young English
men, bound and free, illicit sexual intercourse with Indian and the few
black women was not uncommon. 156 Mixed-race offspring were a
natural byproduct of these sexual unions. Making children born outside
of marriage to unfree mothers free at birth and, more importantly
English subjects, could create problems. Who would support them?
Where would they fit in a society that considered them children of no
one, and conferred legal disabilities on them because of the
circumstances of their birth? It might have seemed wise to some to
avoid addressing the fundamental question about Elizabeth’s status at
birth if she could be freed using some other legal theory.
The committee of Burgesses could have found that Elizabeth was

153.
154.
155.
156.

Billings, The Law of Servants and Slaves, supra note 2, at 52.
Id.
MORGAN, supra note 95, at 336.
Id.
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free without linking her freedom to a free English father. Thomas Key
might have considered Elizabeth a slave when she was born, and decided
to free her when she turned fifteen. There are several examples in
seventeenth century Virginia of negroes being freed by their masters,
usually upon the master’s death. 157 Thus, the agreement between
Thomas Key and Humphrey Higginson might be seen as a manumission
agreement. By interpreting the document this way, Elizabeth’s freedom
at birth claim and the English subject question could be side-stepped.
Elizabeth if not free-born would be an alien and would have to apply to
become a denizen or subject through naturalization.
It also is possible that Thomas Key considered Elizabeth a slave,
but sold her to Humphrey Higginson as an indentured servant. There is
at least one reported case in seventeenth century Virginia of this
occurring.
In 1678, John Cooper, from Boston, sold Antonio,
characterized as a Spanish mulatto, to a Virginia man for a term of ten
years. 158 In the indenture contract Cooper stated that he has the right to
sell Antonio for life, but Cooper stipulated that Antonio would be free at
the end of the ten year term. 159
But even if she was born free, Elizabeth was placed into service and
lost her freedom, albeit temporarily.
The committee’s initial
determination about her father did not automatically resolve the ultimate
question about her current status as free or unfree unless Elizabeth
inherited her father’s legal status as a free English subject. Thus other
factors such as the nature of her transfer from Thomas Key to Humphrey
Higginson were significant and might be important in determining
whether Thomas Key considered Elizabeth an English subject.
The legislative committee noted that Thomas Key imposed several
conditions when he transferred possession of six year old Elizabeth to
Humphrey Higginson. First, Key stipulated that Higginson was to use
Elizabeth for nine years. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
according to the committee, Key stipulated that Higginson use Elizabeth

157. See, e.g., YORK COUNTY ORDER BOOK, 1657-1662, at 45, reprinted in OLD DOMINION,
supra note 1, at 164 (explaining that Mihill Gowen, the negro servant, who in 1657/58, was freed,
along with his son, in the will of his master, Robert Stafford). There also was a negro couple, John
and Isabell Daule who were freed in 1670 by will of their master, Arthur Jordan. SURRY COUNTY
DEEDS AND WILLS, 1657-1672, at 349, reprinted in OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 164-65.
158. MIDDLESEX COUNTY ORDER BOOK, 1673-1680, reprinted in OLD DOMINION, supra note
1, at 164.
159. Id.
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“more Respectfully than a Comon servant or slave.” 160 In essence the
committee determined that Thomas Key wanted Higginson to treat
Elizabeth like an indentured woman in England where service was
considerably milder than in the colony. 161 Upon receipt of the
committee’s report, the General Assembly concluded: “Elizabeth ought
to bee free and that her last Master should give her Corne and Cloathes
and give her satisfaction for the time shee hath served longer then Shee
ought to have done.” 162 No further explanation was provided for this
decision.
The different resolutions of Elizabeth’s case by the General Court
and the General Assembly is surprising given that both bodies were
composed of wealthier colonialists, a few of whom held blacks in some
form of bondage. Instead the General Assembly sides with the County
Court, the more representative legal institution.
One possible
explanation is that members of the General Assembly, including those
committee members who investigated Elizabeth’s case, knew Thomas
Key, an “ancient” settler who briefly served in the Assembly
immediately before Elizabeth’s birth, and were not inclined to disregard
his written wishes regarding his daughter. It may have mattered that
Elizabeth was the child of an early and respected English settler.
Still another explanation is that the General Assembly applied
Conceivably, the General Court interpreted
different rules. 163
Swinburne’s ambiguity about the common law on the legal status of a
slave’s illegitimate child in favor of the Mottrom estate. It also is
possible that members of the Burgess committee investigating
Elizabeth’s case were familiar with Lord Coke’s interpretation of
English common law, or at the very least, read the ambiguous language
in Swinburne’s commentary in favor of Elizabeth. Finally, since during
most of the seventeenth century “judges . . . were without legal advice
from professional attorneys as to the proper interpretation of laws and
precedents, 164 it is possible that some of the decision-makers in this case
were simply mistaken.
This potential conflict about subjecthood and the legal status of

160. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167.
161. See MORGAN, supra note 95, at 127.
162. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 167.
163. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 95.
164. CHITWOOD, supra note 52, at 51. Chitwood notes the colony’s hostility toward lawyers.
Id. But points out that from the middle of the seventeenth century the colony did have an attorney
general. Id. at 51 n.69.
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mixed-race children may explain the need for the 1662 statute saying
that the status of the child follows the mother. Elizabeth’s case merely
crystallized a growing concern about the status of mulatto children born
of Englishmen and black or Indian women. Within a few years, the
legal loophole that provided Elizabeth an avenue to freedom was closed
by the General Assembly.
There are various theories about the motivating factors behind the
1662 statute. Warren Billings says that the law was designed not only to
define the status of mulattoes, but also, more fundamentally, to enforce
racial separation in sexual relations. 165 Feminist historian Kathleen
Brown counters that the 1662 statute reflects the fear that free English
men would wrongly be named as the fathers of African and English
bastard children. 166 In theory, prior to the statute, a pregnant black
woman slave could use the “theatrics” of naming the father of her child
in court to obtain financial support (and possibly freedom) for her child.
The possibility of an embarrassing and costly lawsuit also provided
some protection for vulnerable enslaved negro women from would-be
seducers or rapists which Brown argues the 1662 statute removed. 167
Legal jurist and scholar Leon Higginbotham dismisses the
significance of race and gender as motivating factors. Instead, he claims
that the 1662 statute conferred economic advantage on labor-starved
landowners. 168 The key concern of the General Assembly, according to
Higginbotham, was protecting the property rights of slave owners. 169
Historian Thomas Morris agrees arguing that while “race” was a factor,
the 1662 statute was designed to protect slave owner’s property interest

165. “The statute was an attempt to formulate a practical method of defining the status of
mulattoes, but the law also carried a deeper intent: it sought to keep the races separate.” Billings,
The Cases of Fernando and Elizabeth Key supra note 2, at 473. “Writing [the] civil law doctrine . .
. into [Virginia statutory law] indicates the depth of the lawmakers’ desire to prevent
miscegenation.” Id.
166. KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS:
GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 132-35 (1996).
167. Id. at 133.
168. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 2, at 44.
169. Id.
Once it was established that the black woman’s child took the mother’s status, the master
class gained a crucial economic advantage-its labor force reproduced itself. If the
legislature had followed the English legal doctrine . . . the thousands of blacks or
mulattoes whose fathers were white would have been free . . . By his illicit relations, a
white male could eliminate the cost of purchasing an infant slave; by agreeing to enslave
his progeny he became a breeder of slaves.
Id.
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in the “increase” of the owner’s property. 170 Thus, financial interests in
the protection and enhancement of property trumped concerns about the
lives and future offspring of human chattel held in slavery.
A close reading of Blackstone provides yet another possible
explanation for this law. He claims that because the father is frequently
unknown, and because the woman is “almost useless” to her master
during her pregnancy, she must be maintained at “great expense and
care.” Therefore, the master should be compensated by getting
possession of the woman’s offspring. 171 But as mentioned previously,
Blackstone’s Commentaries, the most influential legal text in colonial
America, comes several decades after the 1662 statute.
Nevertheless, Brown and Blackstone’s concerns are reflected in
other laws enacted during this period. Between 1657 and 1662 the
General Assembly made some significant changes to the bastardy laws,
relaxing the penalties assessed on fathers of these children. For
example, a 1657 act required a man who impregnated a woman servant
to provide the woman’s master with either one year of service or 1500
pounds of tobacco. 172 But the 1661 statute removed that penalty,
leaving the father responsible only for the costs of keeping the child. 173
In addition, both the 1661 and 1662 statutes clarifying the bastardy law
refer to the men as the “reputed” father.
Finally, some historians suggest that the legal principle embodied
in Virginia’s 1662 statute on the status of “illegitimate” children may
have been derived from the rules of English property law which applied
to animals. 174 According to Blackstone, “the English law agree[s] with
the civil, that partus sequitur ventrem in the brute creation, though for
the most part in the human species it disallows that maxim.” 175 The
Virginia colonial assembly was well aware of the rule that applied to the
offspring of livestock. Given that the civil law rule of partus sequitur

170. Morris, supra note 95, at 113.
171. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at Chap. 25, *390.
172. 1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 438-39.
173. 2 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 168.
174. Morris, supra note 95, at 108-14. Morris’s conclusion that the 1662 statute followed
common law rules on livestock finds support in a transaction reported by Breen and Innes. Jane
Gossall, the widow of a free black planter (and daughter of Emanuel Driggus), insisted that her
intended new husband draw up a marriage agreement giving Gossall an unassailable right to
possess, give, sell and dispose of a particular mare colt, along with the colt’s “increase.” T.H.
BREEN & STEPHEN INNES, “MYNE OWNE GROUND”: RACE AND FREEDOM ON VIRGINIA’S EASTERN
SHORE, 1640-1676 84 (1980).
175. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at Chap. 25, *390.
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ventrem is mentioned both by Lord Coke and Swinburne, it seems likely
that some members of the Assembly also would have been aware of the
rule. 176
But there is yet another even more practical explanation for the
1662 statute. If Calvin’s Case 177 really establishes English subjecthood
for all children of English subjects born within the monarch’s domain;
and English subjects are born free, then the Colony’s leaders did not
intend to include “illegitimate” Afro-English children within the
community of English subjects. Virginia was established as an English
colony governed by English subjects loyal to the Crown. While aliens
both free and unfree lived within the colony, arguably the General
Assembly merely wanted to reaffirm that only children of English
women were English subjects. Working from this premise then it was
necessary to enact anti-miscegenation laws which were designed initially
at preventing English women rather than men from marrying negroes. 178
Thus the existence of mixed-raced children was seen as a threat to the
very existence of the colonial community’s and English nation’s
identity. Elizabeth’s father, understanding the unscrupulousness of his
fellow colonialists, tried to protect his offspring from the cruelties of
American indenture as well as possible enslavement. His efforts
coupled with those of Elizabeth and her advocate resulted in her
freedom.
V. LIFE AFTER SLAVERY
We are left to wonder what life was like for a free Anglo-African
Englishwoman in mid-seventeenth century Virginia. Shortly after the
General Assembly’s judgment Elizabeth married William Grinstead,
listed in the court records as her legal representative. 179 But Grinstead
was more than Elizabeth’s legal representative he also was the father of

176. Billings, supra note 96, at 283-84, n.12-13.
177. (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 379 (K.B.) (“[A] man born in Scotland after the accession of
King James the First to the English throne, and during his reign” was allowed the rights of English
subjects).
178. 1691 Act XVI, “An Act for suppressing outlying slaves” bans marriage of free white men
or women “with negroe, mulatto, or Indian man or woman bond or free” and the punishment of such
marriage was banishment from the colony. 3 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 87.
Bastard children of English women “by any negro or mulatto” would be bound out as a servant until
the age of 30, and the mother, if free, paid a fine, and if a servant, she would be sold by the church
wardens for five years after the expiration of her current term of service. Id.
179. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 168.
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her two children – the whereabouts of the first son are unknown. 180
Uncertainty about her legal status was an impediment to their marriage.
Thus Grinstead had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, freedom
for his infant son and his sons’ mother, so he and Elizabeth were acting
in concert.
Self representation was not unusual during this period since lawyers
were expelled from the Virginia colonial court system in 1645. 181
Briefly allowed to practice again in 1656 if licensed by the governor and
county court commissioners 182 , they were expelled again the following
year. 183 County Court days were public events attended by free and
unfree residents, 184 so it is possible that William and Elizabeth probably
attended many court days. Further since Col. Mottrom served as a
County Court judge it is likely that Elizabeth had some first-hand
knowledge of legal proceedings. But as the alleged chattel of the
Mottrom estate, she was not free to travel to Jamestown without the
estate’s consent to present her case before the General Court and
General Assembly, thus it probably fell to William Grinstead to travel by
boat from the banks of the Croan River to the General Court and General
Assembly in Jamestown.
On July 21, 1659, after securing her freedom, the administrator of
Mottrom’s estate transferred the “maid servant” Elizabeth Key,
belonging to the Mottrom estate, and now wife of William Grinstead, to
Grinstead. 185 “Thus, she was protected against anyone who might make

180. Id. at 167 (Testimony of Elizabeth Newman). According to colonial records Grinstead, a
few years younger than Elizabeth, was a farmer and former indentured servant in the Mottrom
household.
181. Act VII of Nov. 1645, reprinted in 1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 302.
182. Act VI of Dec. 1656; Act CXII of March 1657-58, reprinted in 1 Hening, STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 11, at 419, 482.
183. Clara Ann Bowler, Carted Whores and White Shrouded Apologies, 85 VA. MAG. OF HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 411, 423 (1977). Representation for a fee was not permitted until 1680 when a new
licensing provision was enacted. Id. (citing Act VI of June 1680, reprinted in 2 Hening, STATUTES
AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 478-79). It also is possible that Elizabeth and William got someone
with legal training to draft the papers in the case.
184. A festive air surrounded court-days. During these public gatherings people who otherwise
lived in isolation met, interacted, conducted business, gossiped, politicked, or simply learned
important civic lessons. CHITWOOD, supra note 52, at 95. People came from all over the county to
hear the cases. As one historian wrote: “[o]n the court-house green assembled, in indiscriminate
confusion, [came] people of all classes, the hunter from the backwoods, the owner of a few acres,
the grand proprietor, and the . . . negro.” Id. at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. OLD DOMINION, supra note 1, at 168 (Testimony of Elizabeth Newman).
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a legal claim against her as [either] a servant or slave.” 186 The marriage
of Elizabeth and William Grinstead itself is novel in colonial Virginia
during the mid-seventeenth century. While interracial sexual relations
were not uncommon, Elizabeth’s marriage to William Grinstead seems
to be one of the few recorded marriages between an Englishman and a
free woman of African descent during the seventeenth century.
Under a 1642 law free black women had special burdens unlike free
Englishwomen. The statute provided that the labor of black, but not
white women was taxed, thus marriage to a free black woman
automatically increased the tax burden of the family without regard to
the husband’s race. 187 Arguably the financial burden colonial Virginia’s
tax laws placed on free black women may have decreased their chances
of marrying, and may be one reason why despite an equal sex ratio
between black women and men, many free black men, at least on the
eastern shore, married white women. 188 In addition, when you consider
the implications of the later 1662 law tying perpetual slavery to the
wombs of black women, you have another factor discouraging free men,
black or white, from selecting black women as wives.
Presumably as a free Englishwoman Elizabeth would be exempt
from the taxing statute and this might explain why she seems to have
been luckier than most free black women. When John Grinstead died in
1661, Elizabeth married John Parse (Peirce), an English widower. 189 At
his death Parse/Peirce left Elizabeth and her two sons, William and John
Grinstead, five hundred acres of land. 190
As the foregoing discussion indicates, Elizabeth’s life, even as a

186. W. Preston Haynie, African-Americans: Obstacles to Freedom, XXXIII BULL.
NORTHUMBERLAND CO. HIST. SOC. 59, 60 (1996) (citing Northumberland Co. Rec. Bk 1658-66, at
27).
187. 1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 240, 242 (Act I, Church Government).
188. Historian Ira Berlin argues that prominent free black males on the eastern shore of
Virginia married white women during the mid seventeenth century without incident, but there are no
reports of marriages between white men and black women. Instead Berlin cites the marriage of
Elizabeth Key to William Grinstead in Northumberland, not a part of the eastern shore, to argue that
black women could similarly enter into such unions. IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE
FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 44 (1998). Historians T. H. Breen and
Stephen Innes in their study of the eastern shore of Virginia between 1640 and 1676 mention
interracial marriages, but none involving black women and white men. Thus the lack of more
recorded marriages between white men and black women suggests that these unions were more
unusual. Breen and Innes, supra note 174, at 83-84, 88.
189. Haynie, supra note 186, at 60 (citing Northumberland Co. Rec. Bk 1666-72, at 16/19a).
190. Id. (“Grimstead (sometimes spelled Grinstead) remained a Northumberland County name
for 150 years.”).
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servant, was probably more comfortable than most slaves due to the
efforts of her father, Thomas Key, who undertook several actions to
protect Elizabeth from the unscrupulous and greedy members of the
Virginia colony. He placed her in a relatively comfortable servitude
setting and provided written instructions about her care and status. In
this respect she was luckier than most Anglo-African children of her era.
But her legal case is unusual only because aided by the efforts of two
English men, Thomas Key and William Grinstead, she successfully used
the law to gain entry into Virginia colonial community as an English
subject or with the privileges thereof. Her success triggered reactive
legislation quickly closing the door opened by her lawsuit. The
existence of laws in many colonies limiting slaves’ access to the judicial
system suggests that colonial authorities understood the danger of letting
unfree persons have access to the courts. When humans considered
mere chattel by law can exert power or influence the law, these humans
become dangerous 191 , thus Elizabeth Key and others like her who
resisted their enslavement were dangerous women!
VI. CODA
On March 4, 1833 the Northumberland Board of Commissioners
effectuated a General Assembly act authorizing the establishment of
county colonization societies to encourage persons of African descent to
establish colonies in Africa. 192 A John Grinstead was appointed to serve
on a committee to determine the willingness of free persons of color in
the county to immigrate to West Africa. 193 Grinstead is very likely a
third or fourth generation descendant of Elizabeth Key and William
Grinstead. According to the 1830 U.S. Census records John Grinstead is
listed as “white” and living with his wife, three daughters, also listed a
white. More tellingly, Grinstead is listed as owning thirty-one slaves. 194
In little less than two hundred years, Elizabeth’s descendants came

191. The title Dangerous Woman was inspired by a sentence in Karen Berger Morello’s book
about women lawyers in the United States in which she writes: “[t]he reasons for the resistance to
women lawyers can never fully be explained, but it is likely that it has to do with the law’s close
relationship to power in our society.” KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE
WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA, 1638 TO THE PRESENT x (1986).
192. 1833 Va. Acts 14-15.
193. Haynie, supra note 186, at 66-67 (citing Northumberland Co. Order Bk 1830-35, 282-83).
194. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1830 UNITED STATES FEDERAL CENSUS, VIRGINIA,
NORTHUMBERLAND CO. No. M19, roll: 201, page 204.
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to be considered white. When they became white under Virginia law is
unclear since the colony and later the state changed the definition of
“white” several times over the centuries. One of the earliest statutes
enacted in 1705 defined a mulatto as “the child of an Indian, or the child,
grandchild, or great grandchild of a Negro.” 195 Under this statute,
assuming Elizabeth’s mother was a negro and not a mulatto, Elizabeth’s
grandchildren would be considered mulattoes even if their mother was
classified as white. The 1785 law defined anyone with one-eight or less
black ancestry as legally “white.” 196 This means that Elizabeth’s later
descendants, assuming they married white spouses, now were considered
legally white.
But arguably the legal status of later descendants as white would
have been affected by the 1924 law which said that any African ancestry
made one black in Virginia. 197 The law would effectively strip
Elizabeth’s descendants of their long-held white racial status forcing any
who were aware of their African ancestry to hide or cover it. Covering
was necessary to retain the full benefits of American citizenship
conferred on whites, but denied blacks in the early decades of the
twentieth century.

195. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 11, at 1977 (citing Ch. IV, 3 Laws of Va. 250, 251,
reprinted in 1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 250-51).
196. Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 11, at 1978 (citing Ch. LXXVIII, 12 Laws of Va.
184, reprinted in 1 Hening, STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 11, at 184). The 1785 law which
defines who is a mulatto actually briefly made it easier for individuals with some African ancestry
to be classified as white.
197. Id. at 1979 (citing 1924 Va. Acts 534-35; 1930 Va. Acts 96-97).
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